



Civil War Officers Union

William T. Sherman

Excerpts from newspapers and other sources

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SHERMAN'S ARMY--PRES. LINCOLN.

New York, 4th. Senator Sherman, who left his brother, Gen. Sherman, last Saturday, said, in his speech yesterday, the army was rapidly waiting for the next movement.

President Lincoln spent yesterday in Petersburg, returning to City Point at night.

9/4/65

BOSTON ADV

THE DESTRUCTION of the great arsenal at Fayetteville, North Carolina, under the orders of Gen. Sherman, as he passed through that city, is thus related by a correspondent who recently passed through Fayetteville:

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"General Sherman, it is stated, would probably not have destroyed these costly works, had the machinery been left undisturbed; but finding it had been conveyed away with the evident design of bringing it back again, he gave the order for the total destruction of the concern. Immense frameworks were erected outside the walls, on which were suspended by chains bars of railroad iron. These were worked by gangs of men after the manner of battering-rams, endwise, against the brick foundations, until they were undermined in different places, leaving the superincumbent walls to fall down of their own weight. After demolishing in this laborious way, a large part of the structure, including the corner towers, the whole was set on fire and destroyed. It is now a mass of ruins, the fragments of once splendid engines and machinery, the blackened walls and chimneys making a picture of war's desolation truly painful to behold."

BOSTON ADV

GENERALS SHERMAN AND McPHERSON.

March, 1866

IN the March number of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, among the "Unpublished War Letters of Generals Grant and Halleck," there was printed a dispatch from General Grant to President Lincoln, which the length of the article made it necessary to abridge. But so general a desire has been expressed to read the letter unabridged, that I comply with the requests of my correspondents, and now publish it entire :

GENERAL GRANT TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, }
VICKSBURG, MISS., *July 22, 1863.* }

HIS EXCELLENCY, A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States,*
Washington, D. C. :

I would most respectfully but urgently recommend the promotion of Major-General W. T. Sherman, now commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps, and Major-General J. B. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Army Corps, to the position of brigadier-general in the regular army. The first reason for this is their great fitness for any command it may ever become necessary to intrust to them. Second, their great purity of character and disinterestedness in anything except the faithful performance of their duty, and the success of every one engaged in the great battle for the preservation of the Union. Third, they have honorably won this distinction upon many well fought battle-fields. I will only mention some of his services while serving under my command.

To General Sherman I was greatly indebted for his promptness in forwarding to me, during the siege of Fort Donelson, re-enforcements and supplies from Paducah. At the battle of Shiloh, on the first day, he held with raw troops the key points to the landing. To his individual effort I am indebted for the success of that battle. Twice hit, and (I think three) horses shot under him on that day, he maintained his position with his raw troops. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say that I do not believe there was another Division Commander on the field who had the skill or experience to have done it. His service as Division Commander in the advance on Corinth, I will venture, were appreciated by the (now) General-in-Chief beyond those of any other Division Commander. General Sherman's management, as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluff, last December, was admirable. Seeing

the ground from the opposite side of the attack, I see the impossibility of making it successful. The conception of the attack on Arkansas Post was General Sherman's. His part of the execution no one denies was as good as it possibly could have been. His demonstration on Haine's Bluff, in April, to hold the enemy at Vicksburg whilst the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi; his rapid march to join the army afterwards; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the first attack; his almost unequalled march from Jackson to Bridgeport, and passage of that stream; his securing Walnut Hill, on the 18th of May, and thus opening communication with our supplies—all attest his great merits as a soldier.

The siege of Vicksburg, the last capture of Jackson, and the dispersion of Johnston's army, entitle General Sherman to more credit than it usually falls to the lot of one man to earn.

General McPherson has been with me in every battle since the commencement of the rebellion, except Belmont. At Henry, Donelson, Shiloh and the siege of Corinth, as a staff officer and engineer, his services were conspicuous and highly meritorious. At the second battle of Corinth his skill as a soldier was displayed in successfully carrying re-enforcements to the besieged garrison when the enemy was between him and the point to be reached. In the advance through central Mississippi, last November and December, General McPherson commanded one wing of the army with all the ability possible to show, he having the lead in advance and the rear in return. In the campaign and siege, terminating in the fall of Vicksburg, General McPherson has borne a conspicuous part. At the battle of Port Gibson, it was under his immediate direction that the enemy was driven, late in the afternoon, from a position that they had succeeded in holding all day against an obstinate attack. His corps, the advance always under his immediate eye, were the pioneers in the advance from Port Gibson to Hankerson's Ferry. From the North Fork of Bayou Pierre to the Black River it was a constant skirmish, the whole skillfully managed. The enemy was so closely pressed as to be unable to destroy their bridge of boats after them. From Hankerson's Ferry to Jackson the 17th Army Corps marched upon roads not traveled by other troops, fighting the battle of Raymond alone; and the bulk of Johnston's army at Jackson also was fought by this corps entirely under the management of General McPherson. At Champion Hill, the 17th Army Corps and General McPherson were conspicuous. All that could be termed a battle there was fought by two divisions of General McPherson's Corps and Hovey's division of the 13th Corps.

In the assault of the 22d May on the fortifications of Vicksburg, and during the entire siege, General McPherson and his command won unfading laurels. He is one of our ablest engineers and most skillful generals.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

Aug 1886

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*Termination of Lee in Southern Army
General Beauregard*

MY NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL SHERMAN.

WHEN General Lee was appointed General-in-Chief, late in the winter of 1865, a large number of Members of Congress, including Senator Wigfall of Texas (who is my authority for the statement), urged the President to replace me in the military service. This was done by the following telegrams, received together :

RICHMOND, *February 22, 1865.*

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON : The Secretary of War directs that you report by telegraph to General R. E. Lee, Petersburg, Va.

(Signed)

S. COOPER, Adj. and Inspt. General.

HEAD-QUARTERS, *February 22, 1865.*

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON : Assume command of the Army of Tennessee and all troops in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Assign General Beauregard to duty under you as you may select. Concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.

(Signed)

R. E. LEE.

Mr. Davis explains (vol. ii., page 631) that he assented to this assignment "with the understanding that General Lee would supervise and control the operations." This evidently is a mistake. It has been known, since the first military organization, that no one absent from an army can "control its operations."

After learning that this assignment was not disagreeable to General Beauregard, I accepted it, with no other hope than that of contributing to obtain favorable terms of peace ; the only one that a rational being could then entertain. For the result of the war was evident to the dullest, although General Lee's matchless skill and resolution were still maintaining his position against the great Federal power.

The troops placed under my control that might be united to oppose General Sherman's forces, which were not less than 65,000 (instead of being 30,500, as Mr. Davis asserts), amounted, when

concentrated at Bentonville, to not more than 18,500, including 4,000 cavalry. The cavalry, under General Hampton, was observing the march of the Federal army, and harassing it as much as possible. The infantry was in four bodies, at long distances from each other: Hardie's troops, hurrying from Charleston toward Cheraw (6,500 of whom crossed the Cape Fear); Hoke's division of above 5,000, near Goldsboro'; and 3,950 of the army of Tennessee at Charlotte and Goldsboro', under Generals Stewart, D. H. Hill, and Stevenson.

The Federal army was moving from Winnsboro' toward Cheraw, in two columns, occasionally half a day's march apart, and within the quadrilateral at the angles of which were the four bodies of Confederate troops.

My immediate object was to unite these four bodies in front of one of General Sherman's columns, in the hope of attacking it to advantage by striking its head. My ultimate object was to join General Lee when he should abandon Richmond, so that he might fall upon Sherman with our united forces. Later on, however, I learned from him that he could only leave his position by marching to the West. As General Sherman's course from Cheraw made it uncertain whether he would take the road through Raleigh, or that through Goldsboro', the troops of the Army of Tennessee were directed to Smithfield, intermediate between the two routes. With about 1,800 of these troops, under General D. H. Hill, and Hoke's division, General Bragg attacked a much superior force under General J. D. Cox near Kinston, on the 8th of March. The enemy was driven from the field, and pursued by Generals Hill and Hoke with their accustomed vigor. But General Bragg stopped the pursuit. General Cox halted in the first good position, which he intrenched. General Bragg attacked him in it, on the 10th, and was easily repulsed—so easily that his loss in men and material was trifling. But the prestige of victory was left to the enemy, in exchange for the 1,500 prisoners and three field-pieces they lost on the 8th. In action with the left Federal column, General Hardie lost about 500 men, inflicting upon the enemy at least an equal loss.

On the march, encounters of cavalry were frequent. In all those reported to me, General Hampton had the advantage.

From Fayetteville, General Sherman's right column took the direct road to Goldsboro', and the other that by Averysboro'. The

Confederate forces, assembled near Bentonville, attacked this column on the 19th of March, drove it from the field and pursued it a mile, into woods and thickets so dense as to stop the pursuit, by making order and control impossible.

Although all the Federal forces were united before us next morning, we held our position that day and the next against five times our number and were able to carry off our wounded—which was a very slow operation, as we had no ambulances and very few wagons. This action had a happy effect upon our troops and the neighboring people.

General Sherman writes of this action (page 305, vol. ii.) that Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's column, knocking back Carlin's division; but when the rest of the Fourteenth and the Twentieth corps came up he repulsed all of Johnston's attacks. This is a mistake. The Federal troops began the action; making two attacks, each of half an hour's duration. Both attacks were repelled. After these repulses, at about 3 P.M., the Confederate troops assailed the Federals and drove them from the field, which ended the fighting, excepting an occasional Federal cannon-shot. He reports the Confederate loss as four to three, compared with the Federal, although the former had the advantage in all the fighting, and in most of it were covered by breastworks. The statement that the right wing buried 100 Confederates and took 1,287 prisoners is inconsistent with the fact that its men were fully exposed and that ours were under shelter, nor did his men approach our position until the 22d—hours after it had been evacuated. And, again, only 653 of our men were missing at the end of the affair.

General Sherman had a great accession to his forces at Goldsboro'; where he remained until the 10th of April. The Confederate troops were in bivouac during that time—a day's march north-west.

On the 5th, the press dispatches informed us that General Lee had abandoned the lines he had been holding with such admirable courage and conduct.

On the 10th, the Federal army commenced its march toward Raleigh. The Confederate troops moved in the same direction. Having the advantage of a day's march, they reached Raleigh the next afternoon, when I received, by telegraph, orders to report to the President at Greensboro' without delay.

I reached the station there early in the morning of the 12th,

and was General Beauregard's guest in the box-car in which he lodged. It was conveniently near the President's quarters. His Excellency sent for us in an hour or two. We found him with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan. We were told that General Breckenridge was on his way from Virginia, and that Mr. George Davis was unwell. We had supposed that the President wished to obtain information from us of the military condition of that department, but it soon appeared that we were to receive, not to give information. For those present were told, with very little preface, that, in two or three weeks, the President would have in the field a larger army than the Confederacy ever had in its ranks at one time, by calling out the many thousands who had abandoned the service, and all those enrolled by the conscript bureau, who could not be brought into it by the military force used for the purpose by that bureau. It was suggested that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under similar circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely return to it, or enter it, in its present hopeless condition, upon a mere invitation. The fact that we had not arms enough for the soldiers who stood by their colors made this scheme inexpressibly wild. But no opinions were asked and we were dismissed. Before leaving the room, we were told that General Breckenridge's arrival that evening was certain, and that he was expected to bring positive intelligence of the fate of the Army of Virginia.

General Breckenridge came as expected, and reported that General Lee had capitulated on the 9th. After this intelligence, General Beauregard and I carefully considered the state of our affairs. We found ourselves compelled to admit that the military resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Confederacy was overthrown. Subsequently, in conversation with General Breckenridge, I endeavored to convince him of this fact, and represented that the President had but one power of government left in his hands—that of terminating hostilities—which it was his duty to exercise by making peace without delay. I offered to suggest to him the necessity of immediately opening negotiations to arrange the terms of peace between the two sections, should an opportunity be given me. He promised to make one for me next morning.

Later in the evening Mr. Mallory found me, and sought to con-

vince me of the necessity of the course that I had endeavored to impress upon General Breckenridge, and desired me to urge upon the President the need of doing promptly all in his power to end the war. This he thought peculiarly the duty of the ranking military officer. After maintaining that it belonged rather to his constitutional advisers, I told him of the agreement made with General Breckenridge.

General Beauregard and I were summoned to the President's quarters next morning (the 13th); I supposed at General Breckenridge's suggestion. We were desired to compare the military condition of the Confederacy with that of the United States. As spokesman, I said that we had an army of 20,000 * infantry and artillery, and 5,000† mounted troops; against which the United States could bring three: that in Virginia of 180,000, as we were informed; that in North Carolina of 110,000, and that in Alabama of 60,000, making odds against us of at least fifteen to one. Then we had neither money nor credit, and no arms except those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition excepting that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops to repair arms or fix ammunition; and that therefore the only effect of our keeping the field would be the devastation of our country and the ruin of the people, and this, too, without inflicting harm on the enemy. I asserted further that it would be the highest of human crimes to continue the war. General Beauregard assented decidedly to this view.

The members of the Cabinet were then desired by the President to express their opinions as to the possibility of our continuing the war. General Breckenridge and Messrs. Mallory and Reagan concurred with the military officers—that we had been overcome in arms, and that it was necessary to make peace. But Mr. Benjamin entertained the opposite opinion, which he asserted in a speech enthusiastically warlike.

The President then remarked that it was idle to suggest to him negotiation with the Government of the United States, for it was known, from the result of an attempt that he had lately made, that no terms offered by him would be considered, nor would his authority to treat be acknowledged by Mr. Lincoln. I reminded him that, as he knew from his military reading, peace had been occasionally established by the generals of belligerent powers agreeing upon general terms, which, accepted by the two governments, became

* 18,500 actually. † 2,400 only.

the basis of treaties. I suggested that he should permit me to propose negotiations for that object to General Sherman. Mr. Davis opposed this idea; but, in arguing against it, he brought himself to assent to the first plan—that he should propose negotiation to Mr. Lincoln. He sketched a letter appropriate to be addressed by me to General Sherman, asking him to meet me to arrange the terms of an armistice, to enable the civil authorities to agree upon terms of permanent peace. I urged that this course should be taken at once, by his dictating this letter to Mr. Mallory, who was a good penman, and my signing and sending it to General Sherman. It was prepared immediately, and was in these words:

“The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to General Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.”

This letter was immediately dispatched to General Hampton, commanding the Confederate cavalry (who was near Hillsboro’), to be forwarded by him to General Sherman—to whom it was delivered on the 14th.

I left Greensboro’ that evening to rejoin the army, which was marching from Raleigh toward Greensboro’.

In the morning of the 16th, near Greensboro’, I received General Sherman’s assent to the proposed meeting. Supposing that the President was waiting in Greensboro’ to be ready to negotiate should General Sherman agree to the armistice, I went to the town to obtain any instructions he might have for me. There I learned that Mr. Davis was on his way to Charlotte. So, after requesting General Hampton by telegraph to arrange the time and place of meeting, I went to his head-quarters, a few miles east of Hillsboro’. There he informed me that the meeting was to be at noon of the 17th, on the Raleigh road, at a house midway between the pickets of the two armies.

The meeting occurred, as appointed, at the house of a Mr. Bennett. As soon as the door of the room assigned us was closed, and we without witnesses, General Sherman showed me a telegram which he said was brought by a courier who overtook him after he

left the railroad station. It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of the President of the United States. I remarked, after reading the dispatch, that no greater misfortune could have befallen the South than that event.

From his account of this interview, it is evident that General Sherman's memory confounds, I think, occurrences in Raleigh with those in Mr. Bennett's house. The idea that the Confederates could be suspected of such a crime never entered my mind, and the amount of sensibility ascribed to me is unnatural; nor is General Sherman capable of the rudeness of speaking to me in such terms of my President as he attributes to himself. He informed me that an armistice to give opportunity for negotiation by the two governments would be useless, because the Government of the United States did not acknowledge the existence of a Southern Confederacy, and, consequently, it could not recognize any civil officers authorized to make treaties, and, therefore, he could not transmit or receive any proposition to the President of the United States by one calling himself President of the Southern Confederacy. But, after expressing, with an air and manner carrying conviction of sincerity, an earnest wish to avert from the Southern people the devastation inevitable from war, General Sherman offered me such terms as those of Appomattox Court House. I replied that General Lee's capitulation was unavoidable; but that, in my position, the armies being four days' march apart, it could be easily avoided; and I proposed that, instead of a suspension of hostilities, we should agree upon general terms of pacification, as our official positions empowered us to do, and as other generals had done; quoting among other precedents the termination of the war in 1797 by General Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles, the overtures having been made by the victorious general—Bonaparte. On my repeating Bonaparte's sentiment, that if his overtures should save the life of one man, he would value the civic crown so won above any honor merely military, General Sherman evidently, as he said, appreciated that sentiment, and added that to put an end to bloodshed and devastation, and restore the Union, and with it the prosperity of the South, were objects of ambition to him. He regarded joint resolutions of Congress, and proclamations by the President of the United States, as proving conclusively that the restoration of the Union was the object of the war, and he believed that the men of the Union army had been

fighting for that object. A long conversation with Mr. Lincoln at City Point, but a short time before, impressed upon him the opinion that the President then so considered it.

In a short time we agreed upon the terms as written out by General Sherman on the 18th, excepting that he would not consent to include Mr. Davis in the amnesty clause. The afternoon was consumed in efforts to dispose of this question in a manner that would be satisfactory to the Southern President and Southern people. No conclusion had been reached at sunset, when the discussion was suspended, to be resumed at ten o'clock next morning.

On returning to General Hampton's quarters, I telegraphed to General Breckenridge, Secretary of War, to join me, in the hope that his confidential relations with Mr. Davis might enable him to suggest terms satisfactory to the President and people. General Breckenridge and Mr. Reagan came to General Hampton's quarters early next morning. I explained to them the subjects of the discussion between General Sherman and myself the day before, the terms proposed, and the only one not agreed to—that including the Confederate President in the clause giving general amnesty. I stated that I desired assistance of the Secretary of War in making that clause a satisfactory one. Mr. Reagan asked if the terms discussed had been reduced to writing. I replied that they had not. He proposed to write them out. With that object I carefully repeated them to him.

As the United States acknowledged only the military officers of the Confederacy, General Breckenridge and I rode to the place of meeting without Mr. Reagan.

When we met, I explained to General Sherman my reason for asking General Breckenridge's presence, and asked his admission as a major-general, not as Secretary of War, to which he assented. I then presented to General Sherman, as my proposition, the terms discussed the day before, as written out by Mr. Reagan, which included general amnesty, and reminded him that he had already accepted all but one clause. After listening to General Breckenridge, who addressed him six or eight minutes in advocacy of these terms, General Sherman, with my paper before him, wrote very rapidly the agreement which we signed, and which follows. He wrote so rapidly that I was convinced that he had decided to agree to these terms before coming to the meeting. His paper only differs from mine in style, and the addition of the

article to establish the Federal courts, which seemed to me superfluous.

The terms agreed upon were:

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *statu quo*, until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say, forty-eight hours—allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munition of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and, in the meantime, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

7. In general terms—the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,

Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

Four copies were made, one for each President, and one for each signer. General Sherman then returned to his army and I to mine; and each of us announced, publicly, the suspension of hostilities.

Soon after my arrival at Greensboro', Colonel Archer Anderson, adjutant-general of the army, delivered to me two notes, of different dates, from the President. In the first I was informed that the sum of \$39,000, in silver, subject to my order, was in the hands of the Treasury Agent, Mr. J. N——; which I was directed to use as the military chest of the army. In the

other, which was of later date, I was directed to send this money to him in Charlotte. As the faithful soldiers around me had been without pay many months, and were in great need of money, I thought and felt that its best use would be its distribution among them without regard to rank—generals and privates sharing equally, the sick in hospitals being included. The sum divided was \$37,800; \$1,200 having been taken by the commissary-general. I also urged the Secretary of War, in writing, to procure the application of a portion of the specie in the possession of the Administration to the payment of a part of the very large arrears due the troops. The letter was carried by Colonel A. P. Mason, who was instructed to wait for an answer. One was promised by telegraph; but it never came. Mr. Davis asserts (page 691, vol. ii.) that it is more than doubtful if he wrote the notes above mentioned. I assert that *he* does not doubt it. Colonel Anderson's evidence of the distribution of the silver proves that he wrote the first note, which he denies. His denial of the writing of that note invalidates his denial of the other. It was my duty, in such a case, as Mr. Davis well knows, to call the attention of the War Department to the great needs of the troops committed to me.

When I assumed command in North Carolina, there were very large supplies of provision for man and horse in the railroad depôts. But the War Department prohibited their use by the troops serving there, on the ground that they were necessary to the army before Richmond; although those troops could not have consumed them in six or eight months. The wagons of the Army of Tennessee arrived in Augusta in the beginning of March; and Colonel W. E. Moore, chief commissary of the army, was instructed to use one hundred of them to form a line of depôts between Washington, Ga., and Charlotte, for the general object of collecting supplies, and for the possible march of our troops along that line, should General Lee leave his position before Richmond. About the 20th of March, Colonel Moore reported that more than 700,000 rations had been collected in the fine depôts of the line. The meeting of General Sherman and myself on April 17th suggested, among the troops, the idea that peace was to be made, or that they were to be surrendered. So, many of them left the army to plant their crops, but many more to escape becoming prisoners of war. Such as could lay hands on them rode off with the horses and mules belonging to the batteries and trains.

In the afternoon of the 24th I received from the President, who was then in Charlotte, notice by telegraph that he had ratified the terms of pacification agreed upon by General Sherman and me on the 18th. Within an hour thereafter a courier brought me from General Hampton two communications from General Sherman—one giving notice of the rejection of the terms above mentioned by the President of the United States, and the other announcing the termination of the armistice forty-eight hours after noon of that day. These facts were communicated to the administration without delay; and I proposed that, to prevent further devastation of our country by the marching of armies, our army should be disbanded. A reply dated 11 P.M., April 24th, was received early next morning. It suggested that the infantry might be disbanded then, to re-assemble at a place named. I was directed to bring with me all the cavalry, a few light field-pieces, and all other men who could be mounted on serviceable beasts. I declined to obey this order; giving as my reason, that it provided for the performance of but one of the three important duties I had to perform—securing the safety of the President and Cabinet, but not that of the people and of the army, and I suggested the immediate escape of the high civil officers under a proper escort.

The confident belief that it would be a high crime to continue the war governed me in this instance, as it had prompted me to urge the civil authorities of the South to end the war.

The arrangement ordered would have put the great bodies of Union troops in motion, everywhere spreading suffering and ruin among our people, without serving the object of the President's escape as well as an escort of a few picked men would have done.

I determined, therefore, to make another effort to bring about a pacification—within the extent of my command, at least—in the confidence that it would spread fast to the West and South. In that hope I proposed another armistice to General Sherman, and another arrangement, on the basis of the military clause in the agreement of the 18th. General Sherman sent a favorable reply very promptly; so that I was able to set out early on the 26th to meet him at Bennett's, as before, after reporting to the Administration that I was about to do so.

My proposition to General Sherman had been reported to the President, or Secretary of War, when made to him.

We met at Mr. Bennett's about noon ; and, as General Sherman was anxious to restore tranquillity to the country, we soon agreed upon terms, and established peace within the limits of our commands, which were the same. We believed that they would produce a general pacification. They were :

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States Army.

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation.

4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,

Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate Forces in North Carolina.

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation if necessary.

2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the general commanding the department may direct.

3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers and men, to be retained by them.

4. The commanding general of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water from Mobile or New Orleans to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General,

Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding Confederate Forces in North Carolina.

General Sherman assured me that he would transfer from the department all the troops except a small number sufficient to maintain order. He did this by an order issued the next day. Several of the leading officers of his army accompanied General Sherman on this occasion, and their conversation made the clear impression on my mind that they regretted the rejection of the terms of the 18th.

I announced this pacification to the Governors of the States immediately concerned, by telegraph, as follows:

"The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing of arms, the impossibility of recruiting our little army, opposed to more than ten times its number, or of supplying it except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hope of successful war. I have made, therefore, a convention with Major-General Sherman, to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood of this gallant little army, to prevent further sufferings of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of waging a hopeless war."

The general terms of agreement were published to the army on the 27th.

Before the Confederate army came to Greensboro', most of the provisions in depôt there had been wasted or consumed by fugitives from the Army of Virginia, or by the poor people of the neighborhood. That at Charlotte had been consumed by our cavalry encamped near by and stragglers. The depôts established in South Carolina had been emptied in like manner. The consumers, acting upon the opinion, probably, that as there was no longer a government, they might, as well as any others, divide this property, which was sorely needed by most of them.

The only means of feeding the troops on the way to their homes was by distribution of a little cloth and a stock of cotton-yarn to serve them in lieu of currency. But the quantity of these articles on hand was utterly inadequate. General Sherman, however, prevented the great suffering that otherwise would have occurred along the homeward routes of the troops by giving us 200,000 rations, on no other condition than our transporting this provision from the coast to our camps.

The business of preparing and signing the necessary papers was concluded on the 2d of May. They imposed on the members of the Confederate army an obligation not to take up arms against

the United States, and secured them the protection of the Government. The three corps, and as many little bodies of cavalry, were then ordered to march to their homes, each under its former commander. I took leave of those admirable soldiers, in Order No. 22.

"COMRADES: In terminating our official relations, I earnestly exhort you to observe faithfully the terms of pacification agreed upon, and to discharge the obligations of good and peaceful citizens, as well as you have performed the duties of thorough soldiers in the field. By such a course you will best secure the comfort of your families and kindred, and restore tranquillity to our country.

"You will return to your homes with the admiration of our people, won by the courage and noble devotion you have displayed in this long war. I shall always remember with pride the loyal support and generous confidence you have given me.

"I now part with you with deep regret, and bid you farewell with feelings of cordial friendship, and with earnest wishes that you may have hereafter all the prosperity and happiness to be found in the world.

"Official.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General.

"KINLOCK TALCONESS, A. A. G."

The large bodies of Federal troops stationed in the South proved by their conduct that they regarded the restoration of the Union as the object of the war, and treated the people around them as fellow-citizens, as they would have done those of Northern States if stationed among them. This inspired in the South a more kindly feeling for the Northern people and the Federal Government than had existed for ten years before. For it was imagined that those who did not fight were still more friendly than the invaders of our country; and a strong expectation grew that the Southern States would soon enter the Union.

Very few apprehended such "reconstruction" as that soon imposed.

The example of pacification set in North Carolina was followed quickly in the other military departments.

The report of an interview with Mr. Davis, published in the "Globe-Democrat" of St. Louis, about the middle of February, indicates that his memory has failed. For, according to it, he asserted that, on the 24th of April, 1865, immediately after he approved the agreement of April 18th and received intelligence of its rejection by the United States Government, he ordered me to execute a plan of his to prosecute the war, which I disobeyed, al-

though commanding a large army ; a part of which (36,000 men) was paroled at Greensboro'. The proofs that he was conscious, at that time, of his utter inability to wage war, are, that at Greensboro', April 13th, after discussing the subject with four of his cabinet and two generals, he agreed with five of the six, that the military resources of the Confederacy were exhausted, and the endeavor to obtain peace an absolute necessity. And then—on the 24th, the date of the disobeyed order—he ratified the terms of a convention based on the fact that he had not the power to continue the war ; and, but the day before, he wrote to Mrs. Davis in a tone and in terms of utter hopelessness. All the members of his cabinet advocated the ratification of the agreement of April 18th.

These letters have been published. As to my "large army," General Breckenridge testified that, on the 18th it had 14,770 men, and was rapidly diminishing. If Mr. Davis had projected war, he would not have ordered the disbanding of the infantry, who were far more important than cavalry. The object of the order was evidently to strengthen his cavalry guard. He asserted that I had the advantage in cavalry. I had but 1,000 left ; General Sherman nearly 6,000, and General Wilson, in Georgia, nearly 20,000, as they reported. As to the testimony of the numbers paroled, two-thirds of those mentioned by Mr. Davis were men who *ought* to have been in the ranks, but who had quitted them, and were eager to get the protection given by parole. They were like the 53,000 paroled under the same terms of pacification in South Carolina and Georgia.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

LINCOLN AND SHERMAN.

The General's Authority for the Terms of Surrender Given to Johnston.

He Acted Under Direct Instructions from Lincoln—What the President's Views of Reconstruction Really Were—Lincoln's Early Distrust of Sherman.

Special Correspondence of the Globe-Democrat.

PHILADELPHIA, Pa., February 3.—Abraham Lincoln and William T. Sherman had never met until Sherman came to Washington to visit his brother, the present Senator Sherman, ten days after Lincoln's inauguration. Sherman's mission to the capital was not to obtain a command. He had resigned as President of a military institute in Louisiana, because, as he frankly said to the State officials who controlled the institution, he could not remain and owe allegiance to a State that had withdrawn from the Union. In his letter of resignation, dated January 18, 1861, he said: "Should Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be a wrong in every sense of the word." He left New Orleans about the 1st of March to make his home in the North. Like Grant, he ten-



ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

dered his services to the Government, but, again like Grant, his offer was not answered. His first meeting with Lincoln was in company with his Senator brother to pay a brief visit of courtesy to the President. After the Senator had transacted some political business with Lincoln, he turned to his brother and said: "Mr. President, this is my brother, Col. Sherman, who is just up from Louisiana; he may give you some information you want." To this Lincoln replied, as reported by Sherman himself: "Ah! How are they getting along down there?" Sherman answered: "They think they are getting along swimmingly; they are prepared for war." To which Lincoln responded: "Oh, well, I guess we'll manage to keep house." Sherman states in his memoirs that he was "sadly disappointed" in Lincoln, and adds that "he damned the politicians generally," saying to his brother: "You have got things in a hell of a fix; you may get them out as best you can." Sherman then, as ever, was ruggedly honest and patriotic, and often more impressive than elegant in his manner of speech. Some old St. Louis friends had obtained for him the presidency of a street railway of that city at a salary of \$2500. Speaking of this position he says: "This suited me exactly, and I answered Turner that I would accept with thanks."

Sherman was one of the very few Generals who seldom grieved Lincoln. While he was one of the most voluminous of writers on every phase of the war and every question arising from it, he never assumed to be wiser than the Government, and he never committed a serious blunder. He had the most profound contempt for politicians in and out of the army and for political methods generally, and his bluntness of both manner and expression emphasized his views and purposes so that none could misunderstand them. Naturally impulsive, he often felt keenly the many complications which surround all great generals, and he spoke and wrote with unusual freedom, but always within the clearest lines of military subordination. He was an earnest, ardent, outspoken patriot, and had more controversy than any other General, with the single exception of McClellan; but I doubt whether there is a single important utterance of Sherman's during the four long years of war, when new and grave problems had to be met and solved from time to time, that he would have recalled in the later years of his life. He had learned to cherish the most profound respect for Lincoln, although they never met after his first introduction to the President during the early period of the war until the spring of 1865 at City Point, after Sherman had made his march to the sea and his great campaign had practically ended at Raleigh, N. C.

There is no doubt that Lincoln's earliest impressions of Sherman were quite as unfavorable to Sherman as were Sherman's early impressions of Lincoln. It was not until Sherman had been assigned to Kentucky, along with Gen. Anderson, that he attracted the attention of the country. Along with a number of others he had won his star at Bull Run, and on the 24th of August he was sent with Anderson to Louisville. Anderson's feeble health soon demanded that he should be relieved, and Sherman was thus left in command. The position of Kentucky was a most delicate and important one. Sherman succeeded to the command on the 8th of October, and within a few weeks thereafter it was whispered throughout Washington that he was a lunatic. This belief was accepted in most, if not all, military circles at the capital, and was doubtless shared by Lincoln himself, as in little more than two months after he had assumed command in Kentucky he was ordered to report at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, and Gen. Buell was assigned as his successor. The attitude of Kentucky attracted very general interest throughout the country, and the repeated changes of commanders caused great solicitude. I remember calling on Col. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, on the day that the announcement was made of Sherman's transfer to Missouri and Buell's appointment to Kentucky, and asking him what he meant. Scott answered: "Sherman's gone in the head," and upon inquiry I found that Scott simply voiced the general belief of those who should have been best informed on the subject. Reports were published in all the leading newspapers of the country speaking of Sherman as mentally unbalanced, and it naturally mortified the blunt, straightforward soldier to the last degree. Gen. Halleck, in a letter to McClellan asking for more officers, said: "I am satisfied that Gen. Sherman's physical and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to render him, for the present, unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may restore him." But it is only just to Sherman to say that the chief reason for the military authorities in Washington assuming that he was a lunatic was his report, soon after assuming command in Kentucky, stating that it would require an army of 60,000 men to hold Kentucky and 200,000 to open the Mississippi and conquer the rebellion in the Southwest. This was at that time regarded as conclusive evidence of his insanity, and his mental condition was a matter of almost daily discussion in the public journals, with Halstead's Cincinnati Commercial, published in Sherman's own State, leading the crusade against his mental capacity.

When Secretary Cameron and Adj. Gen. Thomas were returning from their investigation of Gen. Fremont's department, soon after Sherman had assumed command of Kentucky, Sherman took special measures to prevail upon Cameron to stop over in Louisville and personally inquire into the condition of that State. Cameron did so, and had a confidential conference with Sherman at the Galt House, in which Sherman said to Cameron that for the purpose of defense in Kentucky he should have 60,000 men, and for offensive movements 200,000 would be necessary. Cameron's answer, as reported by Sherman himself was: "Great God, where are they to come from?" That demand of Sherman's convinced Cameron that Sherman was mentally unbalanced, and on his return to Washington he united with all the military authorities of that day in ridiculing Sherman's demand for 200,000 men to make the war successful in the Southwest and open the Mississippi River. All who have distinct recollections of the war, as well as every intelligent reader of its history, need not now

be reminded that Sherman was the only military man of that day who thoroughly and accurately appreciated the situation in the Southwest, and that his original estimate of the forces necessary to overthrow the rebellion in that section of the country is

proved to have been substantially correct. Buell, who succeeded Sherman in command of Kentucky, had nearly 60,000 men when he was ordered to Grant at Shiloh, and fully 200,000 men were reapers in the harvest of death before the rebellion was conquered in the Southwest and the Father of Waters again went unvexed to the sea.

Sherman was not permitted to take the field until after the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the City of Nashville. From December 23, 1861, to the 13th of February, 1862, he was in charge of the St. Louis Barracks as military instructor. He was first ordered from St. Louis to take command of the post at Paducah, Ky., where he remained until the 10th of March, when he was placed in command of a division and ordered to join Grant for the Shiloh campaign. It will be remembered that he exhibited great skill and courage as a General during the disastrous first day of Shiloh. That was the first action in which Sherman had an opportunity to prove his ability as a military commander, and it is safe to say that from that day until the close of the war Grant regarded him as the best lieutenant in his entire army. He was with Grant at Vicksburg, shared Grant's victory at Missionary Ridge, and when the Atlanta campaign was determined upon in the spring of 1864, there was no question in military circles as to the pre-eminence of Sherman to take the command. His campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta was one of the most brilliant of all the campaigns of the war. It exhibited the most accomplished military strategy, coupled with the wisest direction of an army that had to contend with the enemy always intrenched, and to fight every battle under the greatest disadvantages. Many even of our successful military campaigns have been severely criticised, but I doubt whether any intelligent military man, at home or abroad, has ever criticised Sherman's generalship in his Atlanta campaign. With all his natural impetuosity of temper he was always clear-headed and abundant in caution when charged with the command of an army. In his march to Atlanta he was passing through a country that was, to use his own language, "one vast fort" and with "at least fifty miles of connected trenches with abatis and finished batteries." With the single exception of his assault upon Johnston's lines at Kennesaw, he did not meet with a serious reverse until he entered Atlanta, and it was his dispatch to Lincoln announcing the capture of that city that reversed the political tide of the country and assured Lincoln's re-election.

The names of Lincoln and Sherman are indissolubly linked together in the yet continued dispute over Lincoln's original attitude on reconstruction, as Sherman claimed to represent them in the terms of the first surrender of Johnston to Sherman at Durham Station, N. C. On the 18th of April, 1865, Sherman and Johnston met at the house of Mr. Bennet to agree upon the terms for the surrender of Johnston's army. On the 12th of April Sherman had announced to his army the surrender of Lee. Two days later a flag of truce was received from Johnston proposing "to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property," and suggesting that the civil authorities of the States be permitted "to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war." Sherman's answer of the same date said: "I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself." An interview with Johnston having been arranged by a staff officer, Sherman started from Raleigh on the 17th to fill the appointment with Johnston. When he was about to enter the car he was stopped by a telegraph operator, who gave him the startling information of the assassination of Lincoln on the 14th. He gave orders that no publicity should be given to the death of Lincoln and he did not even inform the staff officers accompanying him. As soon as he was alone with Johnston he communicated to him the fact of Lincoln's assassination, and he adds that "the perspiration came out in large drops on his (Johnston's) forehead, and he did not attempt to conceal his distress." This conference with Johnston did not result in formulating the terms of surrender. Johnston did not assume to possess authority to surrender all the various armies yet in the field, but as Jefferson Davis, with Breckinridge, his Secretary of War, and Reagan, his Postmaster General, were within reach of Johnston, he proposed to meet Sherman on the following day, when he hoped to have authority to surrender the entire Confederate armies remaining in the service. When they met again Breckinridge was with Johnston without assuming to act in any official capacity, and the terms of surrender were formulated and signed by Sherman and

Johnston. So far as the purely military terms were involved, they were practically the same as those agreed to by Grant and Lee at Appomattox. The third article of the basis of agreement provided for "the recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State Governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States." The fifth article provided for substantial amnesty, so far as in the power of the President, to all who accepted the terms of surrender, who should be protected in "their political rights and franchise as well as their rights of person and property." It was provided also that the armies of Sher-



GEN. W. T. SHERMAN.

man and Johnston should refrain from all warlike movements until the terms of surrender were finally accepted, and in the event of failure, forty-eight hours' notice should be given by either side for the resumption of hostilities. Sherman transmitted the agreement to the Government through Grant, and Stanton published the disapproval by the Administration with most offensive reflections upon Sherman.

But for the dispute that arose over Sherman's original terms of surrender with Johnston, Lincoln's views as to reconstruction would never have been crystallized in history. The fact that Sherman claimed to act under the direct authority of Lincoln in the terms he gave to Johnston and to the civil governments of the insurgent States brings up the question directly as to Lincoln's contemplated method of closing the war; and it is notable that many of Lincoln's biographers have injected partisan prejudice into history and have studiously attempted to conceal Lincoln's ideas as to the restoration of the Union. Whether he was right or wrong, it is due to the truth of history that his convictions be honestly presented. The plain question to be considered is this: Did, or did not, Lincoln expressly suggest to Sherman the terms he gave to Johnston in his original agreement of surrender? If he did it clearly portrays Lincoln's purposes as to reconstruction, and fully vindicates Sherman. If he did not thus suggest and instruct Sherman then Sherman is a deliberate falsifier; and who is prepared to doubt the integrity of any positive statement made by William T. Sherman? There were four persons present at the conference held at City Point on the 28th of March, 1865. They were Lincoln, Grant, Sherman and Admiral Porter. It was before these men that Lincoln freely discussed the question of ending the war, and in Sherman's Memoirs he says: "Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civil reorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over." Had Lincoln stopped with the general assurance of his purpose to restore the South to civil government it might be plausible to assume that Sherman misinterpreted his expressions, but Sherman adds the following positive statement: "He (Lincoln) distinctly authorized me to assure Gov. Vance and the people of North Carolina that as soon as the rebel armies laid down their arms and resumed their civil pursuits they would at once be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; and that to avoid anarchy the State Governments then in existence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as the Governments de facto till Congress could provide others." There was no possibility for Sherman to mistake this expression of Lincoln. He was distinctly instructed to assure the Government of North Carolina, the State in which Sherman's army was then operating, that upon the surrender of the insurgent forces all would be guaranteed their rights as citizens, and the civil governments then in existence would be recognized by Lincoln. There was no chance for misunderstanding on this point. Either Lincoln thus instructed Sherman or Sherman states what is deliberately false.

These were the last instructions that Sherman received from Lincoln or from the Government until the surrender of Johnston. In a little more than two weeks thereafter Lin-

coln was assassinated, and the only event that could have been regarded as an additional guide to Sherman was the surrender of Lee, in which all the rights that Sherman accorded to Johnston's army were given to Lee's army by Grant. The testimony of Lincoln could not be had after the issue was raised with Sherman, as Lincoln was then dead; but Sherman knew that on the 6th of April Lincoln had authorized the reconvening of the Virginia Legislature, and thus felt sure that Lincoln was doing in Virginia precisely what he had instructed Sherman to do in North Carolina. Grant, always reticent in matters of dispute except when testimony was a necessity, was not called upon to express any opinion as to the correctness of Sherman's understanding of Lincoln's instructions. Gen. Badeau, who was with Grant at the time he received Stanton's offensive revocation of the agreement between Sherman and Johnston, says that Grant pronounced Stanton's ten reasons for rejecting the terms of surrender to be "infamous." An entirely new condition had been produced by the murder of Lincoln and the succession of Johnson, and had Sherman been advised of the frenzy of public sentiment that followed the assassination of the President he probably would not have obeyed Lincoln's instructions by the promise that the Government would recognize the Confederate civil authorities of the States.

The tragic death of Lincoln aroused public sentiment to the highest point of resentment. The new President was ostentatious in his demand for vengeance upon the Southern leaders. Stanton was most violent in his cry for the swiftest retribution, and it was in this changed condition of sentiment and of authority that Sherman's terms, accorded to Johnston in obedience to the peaceful purposes of Lincoln, were sent to the Government for approval or rejection. Stanton immediately proclaimed the rejection of the terms of surrender in a dispatch given to the public press, in which he denounced Sherman with unmingled ferocity as having acted without authority and surrendered almost every issue for which the war had been fought. So violent was this assault upon Sherman from Stanton that soon after, when Sherman's victorious army was reviewed in Washington by the President and Secretary of War, Sherman refused the proffered hand of Stanton before the multitude. President Johnson subsequently assured Sherman that Stanton's public reflection upon Sherman had not been seen by him nor any of Stanton's associates of the Cabinet until it had been published. Admiral Porter, who was the remaining witness to the instructions received by Sherman, took down notes immediately after the conference ended, and within a year thereafter he furnished Sherman a statement of what had transpired, in which he fully and broadly sustained Sherman as to Lincoln's instructions. I assume, therefore, that it is true beyond all reasonable dispute, that Sherman to his original terms of Johnston's surrender in North Carolina, implicitly obeyed the directions of Lincoln and was therefore not only fully justified in what he did, but would have been false to his trust had he insisted upon any other terms than those he accepted.

This issue made with Gen. Sherman and feebly sustained by a few partisan historians of the time, has led intelligent students to study carefully Lincoln's ideas of reconstruction, and they should be correctly understood to correctly estimate Lincoln's character. I frequently saw Lincoln during the summer and fall of 1864 and winter of 1865. Sometime in August, 1864, I spent several hours with him alone in the White House when he spoke most earnestly about the closing of the war. He had but a single purpose and that was the speedy and cordial restoration of the dissevered States. He cherished no resentment against the South, and every theory of reconstruction that he ever conceived or presented was eminently peaceful, and looking solely to reattaching the estranged people to their Government. I was startled when he first suggested that it would be wise to pay the South \$400,000,000 as compensation for the abolition of slavery, but he had reasoned well on the subject and would answer the arguments he advanced in favor of such a settlement of the war. He knew that he could not then propose it to Congress or to the country, but he clung to it until the very last. He repeatedly renewed the subject in conversation when I was present, and on the 5th of February, 1865, he went so far as to formulate a message to Congress, proposing the payment of \$400,000,000 for emancipation, and submitted it to his Cabinet, only to be unanimously rejected. Lincoln sadly accepted the decision of his Cabinet and filed away the manuscript message with this indorsement thereon, to which his

signature was added: "February 5, 1865.—To-day these papers, which explain themselves, were drawn up and submitted to the Cabinet and unanimously disapproved by them." When the proposed message was disapproved Lincoln sobely asked: "How long will the war last?" To this none could make answer, and he added: "We are spending now in carrying on the war \$3,000,000 a day, which will amount to all this money, besides all the lives."

At Lincoln's conference with Sherman and Grant at City Point, on the 28th of March, he exhibited profound sorrow at the statement of those Generals that another great battle would probably have to be fought before closing the war. Sherman says that "Lincoln exclaimed more than once that there had been blood enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not be

avoided." His great desire was to attain peace without the sacrifice of a single life that could be saved, and he certainly desired that there should be no policy of retribution upon the Southern people. He intimated to Sherman very broadly that he desired Jefferson Davis to escape from the country. Sherman in his memoirs repeats a story told by Lincoln to him illustrative of his wish that Davis should escape "unknown to him," and in discussing the same subject in the White House in the presence of Gov. Curtin, Col. Forney, several others and myself, he told the same story to illustrate the same point, obviously intending to convey very clearly his wish that the Southern leaders should escape from the land and save him the grave complications which must follow their arrest. Secretary Welles, in an article in the *Galaxy*, quotes Lincoln as saying on the subject: "No one need expect he would take any part in hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them. Frighten them out of the country; open the gates; let down the bars; scare them off. Enough lives have been sacrificed; we must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union."

Lincoln's greatest apprehension during the last six months of the war was that the South would not return to the Union and recognize the authority of the Government. He knew that the military power of the rebellion was broken, but he knew that the bitterness that prevailed among the Southern people would be an almost insuperable barrier to anything like cordial reconstruction. He knew that they were impoverished and he feared next to universal anarchy in the South when the shattered armies of the Confederacy should be broken up, and instead of a restoration of peace and industry or anything approaching friendly relations between the Southern people and the Government, he anticipated guerrilla warfare, general disorder and utter hopelessness of tranquillity throughout the rebellious States. It was this grave apprehension that made Lincoln desire to close the war upon such terms as would make the Southern people and Southern soldiers think somewhat kindly of the Union to which they were brought back by force of arms. It was this apprehension that made him instruct Sherman to recognize the civil governments of the South until Congress should take action on the subject, and that made him personally authorize Gen. Weitzel to permit the Virginia State Government to reconvene, as he himself stated it, to "take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and their support from resistance to the General Government." He meant to do precisely what Sherman agreed to do in his terms with Johnston. On Lincoln's return to Washington from Weitzel's headquarters in Richmond he was surprised to find that his consent to the reassembling of the Virginia State Government, like his proposed message offering \$400,000,000 as compensation for slavery, was disapproved by the Cabinet, and that it was likely to be disapproved by the country. He was greatly distressed, and hesitated some time before he attempted to exorcise himself from the complication. Secretary Welles, in the *Galaxy* of April, 1872, page 524, speaking of the question in the Cabinet, says: "The subject had caused general surprise, and on the part of some, dissatisfaction and irritation." Stanton and Speed were especially disturbed about it, and Secretary Welles quotes Lincoln as finally saying that he "was surprised that his object and the movement had been so generally misconstrued, and under the circumstances perhaps it was best the proceeding should be abandoned."

In the meantime Lee's army had surrendered and Lincoln was given a reasonable opportunity to stop the proposed meeting of the Virginia Legislature; and on the 12th of April he wrote to Gen. Weitzel that as the

proposed meeting has been misconstrued, and that as Grant had since captured the Virginia troops so that they could not be withdrawn by the Virginia Legislature, his letter to Judge Campbell should be recalled, and the Legislature not allowed to assemble; but if any had come in pursuance of the order, to allow them a safe return to their homes. In his interview with Judge Campbell and others, in relation to the proposed assembling of the Virginia Legislature, Lincoln had distinctly agreed that if Virginia could be peaceably restored to the Union confiscation should be remitted to the people. The evidence is multiplied on every side that Lincoln intended to give the Virginians exemption from all the retributory laws of war, including amnesty to all who obeyed the Government, just as Sherman provided in his terms of surrender with Johnston; but he was halted in his purpose, as he was halted in his proposed compensated emancipation, by the bitter resentments of the time, which prevailed not only in his Cabinet, but throughout the country. Had he been able to see Sherman after he had revoked the authority for the Virginia Legislature to assemble, he would doubtless have modified his instructions to him, but Lincoln never again communicated with Sherman. Two days after his revocation of the Weitzel order he was assassinated, and four days after Lincoln's assassination Sherman made his terms of surrender with Johnston. Had Lincoln been alive when Sherman's first report of Johnston's surrender was received in Washington, his experience in assenting to the re-assembling of the Virginia State Government would doubtless have made him disapprove the terms acceded to Johnston in obedience to Lincoln's instructions to Sherman; but he would have cast no reproach upon the heroic victor of Atlanta and Savannah, and would have manfully assumed his full share of responsibility for Sherman's action. What policy of reconstruction Lincoln would have adopted had he lived to complete his great work, can not now be known; but it is entirely safe to assume that, while he would have yielded to the mandatory sentiment of the nation, he would in the end have taught the country that "with malice toward none, with charity for all," he could assure the world that "government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth."

A. K. McCLURG

LINCOLN AND SHERMAN

Compiled by HERBERT WELLS FAY, Custodian Lincoln's Tomb

The struggle of freedom and saving the flag that gave Lincoln his everlasting fame, is shared with Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and a long list of efficient commanders. The following tribute will be welcomed by, and filed away by collectors. It is an extract from the memoirs of General Sherman, as follows:

I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever impressed by his kindly nature, his deep, earnest sympathy with the afflictions of the whole people, resulting from the war, and by the march of hostile armies through the South; and that his earnest desire seemed to be to end the war speedily, without more bloodshed or devastation, and to restore all the men of both sections to their homes. In the language of his second inaugural address he seemed to have "charity for all, malice toward none," and, above all, an absolute faith in the courage, manliness, and integrity of the armies in the field. When at rest or listening, his legs and arms seemed to hang almost lifeless, and his face was care-worn and haggard; but the moment he began to talk his face lightened up, his tall form, as it were, unfolded, and he was the very impersonation of good humor and fellowship. The last words, I recall as addressed to me were that he would feel better when I was back at Goldsboro. We parted at the gangway of the "River Queen" about noon of March 28th, and I never saw him again. Of all the men I ever met he seemed to possess more of the elements of greatness, combined with goodness than any other.





Lincoln Lore

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The Contents of Lincoln's Pockets at Ford's Theatre

On February 12, 1976, the Library of Congress revealed the contents of the "mystery box" containing the contents of Abraham Lincoln's pockets the night he was assassinated. The dramatic timing of the announcement — on Lincoln's birthday in the nation's bicentennial year — led to its being widely noted in the press. All over the nation people read that Lincoln had carried a pair of gold-rimmed spectacles engraved by their donor Ward Hill Lamon, another pair of folding spectacles in a silver case, an ivory pocket knife, a fancy watch fob, a large white Irish linen handkerchief with his name embroidered on it in red cross-stich, an initialed sleeve button, and a brown leather wallet. The wallet proved to con-

tain probably the most startling item, a five-dollar Confederate note, and nine old newspaper clippings. The newspaper clippings were dismissed in the news releases with little comment beyond saying that the President could perhaps be forgiven for the minor vanity of carrying old adulatory news items in his pockets.

None of the accounts of the opening which I read — and I read several because I happened to be travelling across the country at the time and saw several different newspapers — bothered to recount even the titles of the articles from Lincoln's wallet. Curiosity was too much to bear, and I wrote the Library of Congress to find out what the articles said. They



DON'T SWAP HORSES.

JOHN BULL. "Why don't you ride the other Horse a bit? He's the best Animal."

BROTHER JONATHAN. "Well, that may be; but the fact is, OLD ABE is just where I can put my finger on him; and as for the other—though they say he's some when out in the scrub yonder—I never know where to find him."

From the Lincoln National Life Foundation

FIGURE 1. John Bright was of a different mind, but most Americans assumed that most Englishmen, like John Bull in this 1864 cartoon from *Harper's Weekly*, supported McClellan rather than Lincoln in the election of 1864.



From the Lincoln National Life Foundation

FIGURE 2. Henry Ward Beecher (1813-1887) was probably the most conspicuous clergyman of his day.

were able to produce photographs of seven of the articles; two are in too poor shape to be taken to the photographer, apparently.

I was glad I wrote when I received the photographs. Contrary to what I had been led to believe by the press coverage, only two of the articles were merely pieces of praise for the President. The other five, though they were not critical, dealt essentially with other subjects. Presumably, we may interpret these articles as indications of some of the problems which engaged the President during the last year of his administration. It would be wrong to place too much emphasis upon them just because Lincoln retained them so long (none of the clippings was from a newspaper printed immediately before the assassination). He was a man of notoriously disorderly habits whose office filing system as a lawyer had consisted of a bundle of legal papers tied together with a note written by Lincoln, "If you can't find it anywhere else look in here." Still, he showed enough initial interest to clip the articles or at least to retain them in his wallet once given them by others.

It is interesting to note the sort of praise which the President valued. Two of the clippings contained nothing but praise, it is true, but the praise came from two quarters where Lincoln had not proven popular in the past. An account of Henry Ward Beecher's address at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia told "how strong a hold the President has upon the popular heart throughout the loyal North." Beecher had written a series of editorials in 1862 which were, from his own recollection, "in the nature of a mowing-machine — they cut at every revolution — and I was told one day that the President had received them and read them through with very serious countenance, and that his only criticism was: 'Is thy servant a dog?' They bore down on him very hard." Things were very different in 1864, and Beecher told his Philadelphia audience that Lincoln's prosecution of the war had been effective.

When an incidental mention of Andrew Jackson seemed to bring forth audience interest, Beecher exploited his opening by saying, "Abraham Lincoln may be a great deal less testy and wilful than Andrew Jackson, but in a long race, I do not know but that he will be equal to him." This was followed by a "storm of applause" which "seemed as if it never would cease." Philadelphia would go for Lincoln in the election of 1864, but Beecher had sensed the campaign strategy which would work in this negrophobic home of General McClellan. The stress would have to be put on Lincoln's Jacksonian qualities as a stern and uncompromising foe of separatism. The election would not be a referendum on the popularity of emancipation and the Republican platform's commitment to the Thirteenth Amendment — if it could be avoided.

A large photograph of John Bright, the British liberal, hung in the anteroom of Lincoln's office in the White House. Doubtless, the President was gratified to read the clipping about "John Bright on the Presidency." In a letter written to Horace Greeley before the election of 1864, Bright observed that "those of my countrymen who have wished well to the rebellion, who have hoped for the break-up of your Union, who have preferred to see a Southern Slave Empire rather than a restored and free Republic, . . . are now in favor of the election of Gen. McClellan." On the other hand, "those who have deplored the calamities which the leaders of secession have brought upon your country, who believe that Slavery weakens your power and tarnishes your good name throughout the world, and who regard the restoration of your Union as a thing to be desired and prayed for by all good men, . . . are heartily longing for the re-election of Mr. Lincoln." Lincoln's election would prove that republican countries could survive "through the most desperate perils."

Lincoln seems to have been taking a keen interest in the state of Confederate morale. Two of the clippings dealt with this subject. Both carried the news that disaffection among the Confederate soldiers was high. "The Disaffection Among the Southern Soldiers" republished a letter from the *Toledo Blade* which had been "picked up in the streets of Brandon, Mississippi, by Captain Dinnis, of the 62nd Ohio Regiment." Dated July 16, 1863, the letter complained of "the vacillating policy and hollow promises" by which the soldiers had been "duped so long." With no provisions prepared along the route of retreat, the army was moving slowly. The Confederates paroled at Vicksburg were deserting. "The negro emancipation policy," the letter continued, "at which we so long hooted, is the most potent lever of our overthrow. It steals upon us unawares, and ere we can do anything the plantations are deserted, families without servants, camps without necessary attendants, women and children in want and misery. In short, the disadvantages to us now arising from the negroes are tenfold greater than have been all the advantages derived from earlier in the war." Certainly, this was welcome vindication of Lincoln's policy of emancipation, which had been justified precisely on the grounds that it would weaken the Southern war effort.

"A Conscript's Epistle to Jeff. Davis" shows the President's interests in rather a different light. This article also purported to reprint a captured Confederate letter, but the letter was much more satirical in tone and surely spoke in part at least to Lincoln's love for rough humor. Addressing the Confederate President as "Jeff, Red Jacket of the Gulf, and Chief of the Six Nations," one Norman Harold of Ashe County, North Carolina, expressed his desire to desert the "adored trinity" of the Confederacy, "cotton, niggers, and chivalry." He denounced Davis in mock-monarchical-reverence as the "Czar of all Chivalry and Khan of Cotton Tartary," as "the illegitimate son of a Kentucky horse-thief," and as the "bastard President of a political abortion." In the end he expressed the "exquisite joy" which the soldiers would express when Davis "shall have reached that eminent meridian whence all progress is perpendicular." Surely Lincoln found in all this exaggerated bombast some gratification that his Confederate counterpart would bear the burden of outrageous vilification that Lincoln himself had on occasion to bear. Here were the same accusations of monarchical pretensions. And here were the same doubts of proper Kentucky paternity. It must have been reassuring to find that this was the token of partisan discontent and not the result of reasoned and careful

research into the biographical backgrounds of Presidents.

Lincoln also carried with him "Sherman's Orders For His March," a straightforward reprinting of the military commander's outline for his campaign. Lincoln must have realized the great importance of these orders, which constituted the beginnings of a new era in military history. General Sherman carefully instructed his army that there would be "no general trains of supplies," but each regiment would have only "one wagon and one ambulance." Each brigade would have behind it "a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons and ambulances," but the army was obviously going to travel light, for they were to "start habitually at seven a. m., and make about fifteen miles per day." To do this, the general said, the "army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather near the route traveled corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command; aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten days provisions for the command and three days forage." Sherman enjoined certain restraints upon his men: "Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or a camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road traveled." Nevertheless, Sherman directly ordered the wholesale destruction of economically useful property in hostile districts:

V. To army corps commanders is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, &c., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

Sherman's orders even embodied a political interpretation of the nature of the conflict when they allowed the cavalry and artillery to "appropriate freely and without limit" the horses, mules, and wagons of the inhabitants — "discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, usually neutral or friendly." Again, he urged restraint. "In all foraging," he said, "of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance." There was no sentimentality in his provisions for coping with live contraband: "Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns, may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms." Clearly, President Lincoln understood the nature of Sherman's epoch-making campaign well and did more than fret over whether the general would be cut off and surrounded by his bold move.

Even as late as 1864, President Lincoln remained preoccupied with the problems of the Border States and, in particular, of Missouri. Two of the clippings dealt with Missouri. "The Message of the Governor of Missouri" defended Governor Hamilton R. Gamble from charges of "copperheadism or disloyalty." Not only did his message pledge him "to support the Government with all our energies in its endeavors to suppress the rebellion in other States," but he also accepted a recent Ordinance of Emancipation "as a measure that will, in a brief period, accomplish the great object to be attained in making Missouri A FREE STATE." He also encouraged the emigration of free laborers from Europe. "If Governor GAMBLE were a Kentuckian," the newspaper remarked, "we should think him a very sound Union man. We do not know but he would be charged with being an 'Abolitionist.'" This article contained some praise for the President, because it condemned radicals who charged him with deserting the cause of

freedom for not giving in to "demands of the radicals that seemed intolerant and obtrusive." The article concluded: "The charge is unfounded and absurd. Doubtless he would rejoice as heartily as any radical, at the speedy abolition of slavery in Missouri, but he is not disposed to encourage excesses that might damage the good cause itself."

Some of the reasons for the dispute over emancipation policy in Missouri are readily apparent in another clipping from Lincoln's wallet, "Emancipation in Missouri." This article simply printed the Ordinance of Emancipation passed by the Missouri State Convention. Slavery was to end in Missouri on July 4, 1870. On that day all slaves in the state were to be free, "Provided, however, that all persons emancipated by this ordinance shall remain under the control and be subject to their late owners, or their legal representatives, as servants during the following period, to wit: Those over forty years of age, for and during their lives; those under twelve until they arrive at the age of twenty-three; and those of all other ages until the 4th of July, 1876." "Apprenticeship" was the term which was used to describe the nature of the proposed relationship between Missouri's "freedmen" and their "former" masters. However, we sometimes forget how limited a form of freedom apprenticeships can be because we use the term "apprentice" today to mean little more than "understudy." The Missouri Ordinance of Emancipation drew a good deal harsher picture: "The persons, or their legal representatives, who, up to the moment of emancipation, were owners of slaves hereby freed, shall, during the period for which the services of such freedmen are reserved to them, have the same authority and control over the said freedmen for the purpose of receiving the possessions and services of the same that are now held by the masters in respect of his slaves; provided, however, that after the said 4th of July, 1870, no person so held to service shall be sold to non-residents or removed from the state by authority of his late owner or his legal representative." In fact, then, those forty years old and above forever, children until the age of twenty-three, and everyone for at least six



From the Lincoln National Life Foundation

FIGURE 3. John Bright (1811-1889) was a British liberal whose letters to Charles Sumner were read to President Lincoln.

years after 1870, would be serfs who could not earn the product of the sweat of their brows and whose only rights were (1) the right not to be sold to non-Missourians and (2) the right not to be removed from Missouri by their masters.

The Ordinance of Emancipation was basically Governor Gamble's plan. It was opposed by more radical Missourians who were called "Charcoals" for obvious reasons. Gamble led the opposing "Claybank" faction, so called because they were supposedly the occupants of colorless middle ground on the hot political question of slavery. Though there were some who were more conservative than Gamble — "Snowflakes," who thought slavery could somehow survive the war in Missouri, and Frank Blair, who still longed for the impossible dream of colonization, Gamble's was the conservative faction in Missouri politics at this time. It was little wonder that radical critics found his emancipation plan less than satisfactory, for it offered freedom to no one in less than twelve years from the date of the Ordinance (1864). Charcoals, though they preferred January 1, 1864 as the date of emancipation, were willing to settle for November 1, 1866. In the end, the political situation changed in Missouri, and slavery was abolished in the state in January of 1865.

Although it is true that none of the clippings was critical of President Lincoln and that all could be construed in some way as praise for him or as testimony to the success of his policies, it seems inadequate to dismiss these interesting clippings as the tokens and badges of a harmless Presidential vanity. The contents of these articles can help to illuminate the preoccupations of the mind of one of America's least confiding Presidents.

This was a man who especially valued the hard-won praise of his sometime critics. This was a man who realized the value of international opinion and who, despite his provincial background, cared for the opinions of the great world beyond the borders of the United States.

In 1864, as always, Lincoln was a man preoccupied with politics and social questions. These clippings did not contain gems of helpful political philosophy or religious musings. They show the President to have been preoccupied with what historians like James G. Randall, Reinhard Luthin, and David Donald have said he was preoccupied with, the realities of politics

and power — the strength of the Confederacy, the success of his emancipation policy, and the never-ending factional problems of Missouri politics. This was a politician's wallet, and all we can tell of his personality from the nature of the articles is that he liked humor.

It would strain these materials too much to argue with any certainty that they show us the way the President's mind was leaning near the end of his life. Still, we cannot ignore the bearing of these articles on some of the great questions of Lincolniana. When Lincoln discussed gradual emancipation with Confederate representatives at Hampton Roads in February of 1865, did he by any chance have something as leisurely as Missouri's plan in mind? When he allowed himself to think of states of quasi-freedom like apprenticeship as sequels to slavery, was he thinking of anything as restrictive as Missouri's plan of apprenticeship? Was Lincoln's conception of warfare clearly that of Sherman as described with such clarity and force in that General's orders for the march

through Georgia? Was Lincoln not fully cognizant of the extent to which the war-nurtured passions of the North would demand some psychological satisfactions from Jefferson Davis, the "Czar of Chivalry," and the rich Southerners who allegedly led the poor and industrious Southerners into a war they cared nothing about? All of the questions of Reconstruction seem to burn through these pages with an intensity and brightness that makes clear that these questions surely were the major preoccupations of the President in 1864. The atmosphere of the Hampton Roads Peace Conference and of the early period of Reconstruction with their preoccupations with sequels to slavery and the problems of dealing with the former Confederate leaders is already in these worn fragments of newspaper articles which were found in the wallet of a President released at last from turmoil and strife on April 15, 1865.

Editor's Note: I wish to thank Mrs. Mary C. Lethbridge, Information Officer of the Library of Congress, for supplying us with photographs of the clippings in Lincoln's wallet.

J. Duane Squires of New London, New Hampshire, has caught two errors in *Lincoln Lore*. In Number 1664, Senator Hale was from New Hampshire not Maine. In Number 1667, Adams was a "Minister" not an "Ambassador," a title not created until 1893.



From the Lincoln National Life Foundation

FIGURE 4. General William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-1891) forbade pillaging by his soldiers when he was in command around Memphis in 1862. His decision to march through Georgia late in 1864 in order to attack the South's only untouched base of supply, Georgia, launched him to international fame. By taking the war to the civilian economy rather than simply to the lives of soldiers, he wrenched war out of its eighteenth-century assumptions and pushed it towards the twentieth century.

CC: M. NEELY, File

Sherman Letters Show Civil War General Regarded Reporters as 'Spies'

By JAMES BARRON

In 1984, Joseph H. Ewing opened a folder of letters addressed to his great-grandfather and grandfather in an almost illegible scrawl. The letters had lain in a locked trunk for 40 years and in a bank safe-deposit box for 30 more, and all Mr. Ewing knew was that they had been written by William Tecumseh Sherman.

As he began reading, Mr. Ewing, a retired Army historian who lives in Wheaton, Md., realized that the family archive was an unexpected source of new details about a military leader whose friends thought he was irrational and whose enemies thought he was insane.

The letters, often written late at night in his tent, followed Sherman through some of the Civil War's bloodiest battles, including the devastating Union sweep through Georgia in 1864 that he directed. Sherman had been reared by Mr. Ewing's grandfather after his own father died, so the correspondence has the emotion of a son's letters home.

Long Diatribe on Press

Sherman never had a kind word for war correspondents or newspaper editors, and among the Ewing letters is an 11-page denunciation of the press. Mr. Ewing said it was the longest and most revealing piece Sherman ever wrote on the subject, and some historians who have seen the letters say Sherman's anger reminds them of Gen. William Westmoreland, who complained about news coverage in Vietnam and later unsuccessfully sued Time magazine for libel.

To Sherman, journalists were "spies" whose dispatches were "false, false as hell." Still, Sherman was dismayed that they provided the enemy with detailed information on his battle plans.

Sherman was not much kinder to newspaper readers. He called them

"the non-thinking herd," adding, "Vox populi, vox humbug."

Mr. Ewing said many of Sherman's complaints stemmed from technology that was just becoming widespread in the Civil War.

The newly invented telegraph made it possible for war correspondents' dispatches about preparations for a battle to appear in Northern newspapers before the fighting began. Sherman often complained that the papers were then sent to Confederate operatives before he had a chance to attack.

To halt this flow of information, Sherman banned reporters from traveling with his troops and had one correspondent court-martialed for disobeying.

In other letters in the Ewing collection, the Union general who marched through Atlanta said "it would be a good thing" if the Confederate general Robert E. Lee seized Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, just to teach the War Department "some sense."


In another letter Sherman said his fellow Union general, Ulysses S. Grant, "cannot make a speech of five sentences."

Complained of Poor Discipline

In another, he suggested turning Arkansas into a colony for slaves. And he complained that discipline was higher among Confederate troops than among his own. On April 21, 1864, he wrote, "So many men want a furlough, and it is like drawing teeth to get them back."

Mr. Ewing, who is 77 years old, said the letters provided little new information about Sherman. But they round out the image of the irascible general, mounted on his horse, puffing on a cigar, sloppily dressed, quite different from the imposing figure in bronze mounted on a pedestal between the Plaza Hotel and Central Park.

Mr. Ewing, who quoted some of



"Sherman's March Through Georgia," an oil on canvas painted by A. B. Carlin in 1871.

he letters in an article published in the July issue of American Heritage magazine, said he paid little attention to his family's Sherman connection while he was growing up. "My father would talk about Sherman," Mr. Ewing recalled last week. "We owned a Victrola and I remember hearing 'Marching Through Georgia' when I was young and hearing him talk about Sherman. I remember asking him if he ever talked to Sherman, and he said no, but Sherman had patted his head once when he was a little boy."

About 70 years ago, Mr. Ewing said, his father inventoried the 24 letters, but he never published them and never shared them with biographers or scholars. Mr. Ewing did not get around to reading them until after he retired.

In addition to the general's letters, the folder contained such miscellaneous items as a letter from the 16-year-old Sherman acknowledging his appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point and a page from the academy's conduct reports for February 1839 showing

that the young cadet had earned four demerits that month.

Sherman wrote the earliest letter in the collection on March 4, 1832, when he was a 12-year-old schoolboy in Lancaster, Ohio. He had yet to master the rules of capitalization and punctuation in the 16-line note to his foster father, Thomas Ewing, who was serving in Washington as a United States Senator.

That note mentioned Senator Ewing's daughter, whom Sherman married in 1850.

Once he became a soldier, the let-

ters show that Sherman saw himself much as historians see him: as a hard-charging, hard-talking character, a soldier who sometimes says more than he means, and in the most direct way possible. "Abrupt I am, & all military men are," he told Mr. Ewing's grandfather.

The early battles of the Civil War, Mr. Ewing said, sharpened Sherman's enmity toward the press.

"I will illustrate why I regard newspaper correspondents as spies," Sherman wrote on Feb. 17, 1863. "A spy is one who furnishes an enemy with knowledge useful to him and dangerous to us. I say in giving intelligence to the enemy, in sowing discord & discontent in an army, these men fulfill all the conditions of spies. I am satisfied they have cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars & brought our country to the brink of ruin & that unless the nuisance is abated we are lost."

"While they cry about blood & slaughter they are the direct cause of more bloodshed than fifty times their number of armed Rebels," he wrote.

The correspondent who defied Sherman's ban on journalists traveling with him was Thomas W. Knox of The New York Herald. At his court-martial, Mr. Knox was found not guilty on a charge that he gave intelligence to the enemy. But he was found guilty of disobeying Sherman's order by accompanying the army down the Mississippi, although the court "attaches no criminality thereto." The tribunal ordered him not to return to the front.

Sherman had the last word. Mr. Knox appealed to President Lincoln, who countermanded the sentence on the condition that Sherman's superior, Grant, agree. Grant did not, turning the matter over to Sherman.

"Come with a sword or musket in your hand, prepared to share with us our fate, and I will welcome you as a brother and associate," Sherman wrote. But come as a reporter, he added, "And my answer is Never!"

AMERICAN HERITAGE

JULY-AUGUST 1987 \$4.50

**THE EPIC DEFENSE OF
WAKE ISLAND**


**HOW OUR PRISONS
GOT THAT WAY**

FDR: THE LAST PHOTO

SHERMAN BASHES THE PRESS

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, February 6, 1863:

"The Newspapers declare me their inveterate enemy, and openly say they will write me down. In writing me down are they not writing the Cause and the Country down? Now I know and every officer knows that no army or detachment moves . . . that is not attended by correspondents of hundreds of newspapers. . . .



They encumber our transports . . . eat our provisions . . . publish without stint . . . in-

formation of movements past & prospective, organizations, names of commanders . . . no matter how rapidly we move, our enemy has notice in advance. . . . Never had an enemy a better corps of spies than our army carries along, paid, transported, and fed by the United States."

At War With Himself

A biography of General Sherman focuses on his inner turmoil.

CITIZEN SHERMAN

A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman.

By Michael Fellman.

Illustrated. 486 pp. New York: Random House. \$30.

By Gary W. Gallagher

MICHAEL FELLMAN offers perhaps the darkest portrait of William Tecumseh Sherman since former Confederates wrote about their great antagonist. Little concerned with narrating Sherman's military campaigns, Mr. Fellman seeks "to understand the origins and shaping, both personal and cultural, of this man; to set his profoundly important Civil War leadership in emotional as well as in social, intellectual and ideological contexts; and to place his military activities in the far broader webs of the experience of a long life."

The frustrations and failures of Sherman's first 41 years dominate the opening section of "Citizen Sherman." Mr. Fellman, a professor of history at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, argues that the death of his father in 1829 deeply scarred the 9-year-old Tecumseh. "Fear of betrayal and abandonment, bouts of depression, and diffuse and frequently explosive rage characterized the adult Sherman," he writes, and "must have been connected to his experience of truncated patrimony." Never close to Thomas Ewing, a family friend who took him in after his father's death, Sherman considered himself an outsider without strong family support. In 1850, he married Ewing's daughter Ellen, a devout Roman Catholic with whom he endured a troubled marriage. They quarreled about religion, lived apart for long periods and sniped at each other in letters. "He was unhappy nearly all the time and quite often deeply depressed," Mr. Fellman says, "in part because of his worldly failures, but at least as much because of his marriage."

Sherman's worldly failures included military service in backwater California while comrades won fame during the Mexican War, financial disaster during the late 1850's and a debacle as commander of the Union Army of the Cumberland early in the Civil War. The last of these episodes shattered Sherman's fragile self-confidence.

In examining these unhappy experiences, Mr. Fellman sketches an unappealing man who distrusted people and scorned democracy because it lacked mechanisms to control a potentially unruly population. Unmoved by moral arguments against slavery, Sherman refused to see black people as human. As war approached in 1861, Mr. Fellman observes, Sherman defended slavery and "hated the American Government, the American democratic political system and its leaders, and ... despised the American people."

The second part of the book explores Sherman's emergence as a hero. Assigned to Ulysses S. Grant's army in 1862, he participated in the Northern victory at Shiloh. That battle profoundly affected Sherman, unleashing "an enormous creativity and an equally enormous destructive rage." Formerly, Mr. Fellman writes, "Sherman had turned that rage against himself in terribly damaging self-reproach, and had fallen into ever-deepening depression. Now he would sublimate those extreme self-doubts into a fatalistic, almost transcendent commitment to battle. He would assault, verbally and militarily, all his enemies, one after the other, with mounting ferocity."

Sherman's chief enemy became the people of

Gary W. Gallagher is a professor of history at Pennsylvania State University and the editor of "The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock."



PHOTO HISTORICAL SOCIETY/FROM "CITIZEN SHERMAN"
William Tecumseh Sherman and his 9-year-old son, Tom, in 1865.

the Confederacy, to whom he promised terror while the war continued and kindness when their rebellion ended. "My aim then was to whip the rebels," Sherman explained in his memoirs, "to humble their pride, to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us." Mr. Fellman asserts that "for rage, ruthlessness, cold psychological calculation and clarity of expression, no American military figure has equaled" this statement. Only Sherman had the conscious ability "to make psychological war against the Southern people," and his ferocity "was tied to one sole issue: obedience to the authority of the Union."

Sherman's march across Georgia and South Carolina allowed him to unleash terror on the white South. Mr. Fellman finds "sadistic purpose" in Sherman's determination to expose the vulnerability of Confederate civilians and teach them, as he put it, "that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms." When confronted with an utterly defeated enemy in April 1865, however, Sherman granted such gentle surrender terms that Republican politicians forced him to adopt language similar to that earlier used by Grant at Appomattox.

The long final section of the book takes Sherman through the quarter-century before his death in 1891, during which he presided over a shrinking Army, feuded with old comrades, indulged in love affairs and became, in Mr. Fellman's words (with implicit apologies to George Washington and others, no doubt), "as famous an American man as ever lived."

Mr. Fellman's interpretation of Sherman will probably inspire lively reaction among scholars. Its psychological emphasis will distress anyone who doubts that the psyches of historical figures can be probed with any certainty. The repetition of words like "rage," "ferocity," "sadistic" and "ruthless" will strike other readers as overly provocative. Mr. Fellman's relatively brief attention to Sherman's battles and campaigns will prompt still others to question whether he has done justice to a man who was pre-eminently a soldier.

Although Mr. Fellman deftly fits most aspects of Sherman's life into his interpretive framework, a few questions linger. For example, why did a man who loathed the United States and its people care so passionately that the Confederacy submit to Union authority? And how did Sherman — so unsympathetic a character in Mr. Fellman's reading — earn devotion from his soldiers and adulation from fellow Northerners?

Such questions and complaints should not obscure the value of "Citizen Sherman." Mr. Fellman's boldly argued and gracefully written study merits the attention of anyone interested in its brilliant and volatile subject. □

NAT 8-6-95

The devil in Gen. Sherman

Understanding William Tecumseh Sherman, hero and scourge

Citizen Sherman:

A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman

By Michael Fellman
Random House, 465 pages, \$30

Reviewed by Harold Holzer
Author of "Dear Mr. Lincoln: Letters to the President"

offered the finest history yet written on Civil War guerrilla fighting in the border state of Missouri, has offered as gripping and original a life story as has yet been produced on William T. Sherman.

He never acknowledged an error and never repeated it."

So a contemporary described the ever-controversial William Tecumseh Sherman, who made Georgia howl on his brutal Civil War march from Atlanta to the sea, and later, in one of the great understatements in military history, declared that war was "hell." To millions of unrepentant Southerners, now as then, Sherman knew whereof he spoke: He was nothing less than the devil himself.

Explanations for the rise of such figures—ordinary civilians mysteriously transfigured by war into military heroes—have long stoked the fires of Civil War literature. How, for example, did the failed Illinois tanner Ulysses S. Grant become the resolute conqueror of the Army of Virginia? How did the old man his detractors labeled "granny" emerge as the gallant Robert E. Lee? And what made Thomas Jackson, the eccentric zealot who talked to himself and sucked on lemons, stand as fast as a stone wall at Bull Run?

Somewhat, the key to the Sherman riddle has until now eluded biographers. It was almost as if historians dreaded the prospect of probing the roots of what flowered as wholesale devastation.

Now Michael Fellman, whose best-known previous book

Fellman confides that he was

inspired to undertake his exhaustive research when he encountered a haunting passage in Sherman's own brilliantly crafted (and underappreciated) memoirs. Writing of his plan to march to the Georgia coast after sacking Atlanta, the general admitted almost blithely: "My aim . . . was to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to follow them, to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us." Fellman reacted by concluding, "for rage, ruthlessness, [and] cold psychological calculation, no American military figure has equalled Sherman's statement." And until this book, no American biography has probed that fearful anger so thoroughly and with such revealing results.

From the story of Sherman's childhood, which Fellman chillingly reports under the justifiable title "Humiliation," one better understands the rage that erupted later. Sherman's father died before the boy was 10, leaving "Cump" and 11 siblings worse off than orphans—their mother, unable to cope, was compelled to parcel the children out to other families, and the future general ended up a stepson to a rich lawyer and future U.S. Senator named Thomas Ewing. A worse fate might have befallen a fatherless boy, but Ewing's benevolent dominance came close to crushing his young ward's spirits. Tecumseh was



William Tecumseh Sherman

given a "proper" new first name, William, and baptized a Roman Catholic, a religion he never fully embraced.

Sherman did not exactly rebel against these new constraints—perhaps out-and-out indignation would have cooled the anger that boiled slowly within him. Instead he spent decades tottering between appreciation and resentment, obedience and independence. He managed to break sufficiently free to enroll at West Point, but when he set his sights on a wife, he chose Ewing's own daughter, a union hardly calculated to liberate him from his confusing familial status. From all the evidence, the marriage was thoroughly miserable for both parties. The Shermans were unhappy when they were together, and William was unhappy and jealous when his wife returned to the comforts of her father's house for her increasingly lengthy "visits." Sherman was like a battle

waiting to erupt, and the Civil War gave him the opportunity not only to vent his frustrations but also to achieve fame for so doing. Sherman shunned an offer of a railroad job to rejoin the army; even so, the path to glory was hardly smooth. He suffered what Fellman concludes was a severe nervous breakdown in 1861. He very nearly botched his first great opportunity, at the Battle of Shiloh the following year. He was encumbered by uncompromising racism ("when negroes are liberated either they or their masters must perish," he wrote as late as 1862). He nursed an unseemly anti-Semitism (he was constantly chasing "swarms of Jews," he complained). And he took perverse pride in a violent hatred for the press (to Sherman, they were "a set of sneaking, croaking scoundrels"), in return for which war correspondents repeatedly "wrote him down" until his achievements could no longer be ignored.

Sherman climbed steadily in the esteem of his commander, Ulysses S. Grant, not to mention a North desperately hungry for heroes and victories. And Sherman gave them both at Atlanta in the summer of 1864. Leaving the city in ruins, he headed east, cutting a swath of unprecedented destruction through civilian Georgia. "We cannot change the hearts of those people of the South," Sherman explained to Grant, "but we can make war so terrible that they will" throw down their arms. Sherman's armies devastated Georgia and the Carolinas, and Fellman reckons that the general waged psychological warfare as ruthlessly as he burned

homes, destroyed railroads and appropriated food along the way. By December 1864, Sherman could boldly present the city of Savannah to Lincoln "as a Christmas gift." The "scourge of the South" had earned his nickname in blood.

Fellman might have ended his book with the sudden, uncharacteristic burst of generosity that animated the surrender terms Sherman wrote to end the war in North Carolina, or with the reports of the hero's bizarre ill-temper at the grand parade of Union armies back in Washington. Instead he explores the lion in winter, calculating the effect on Sherman of the death of his son, and the debilitating impact of his crumbling marriage. The highlight of the postwar section can be found in the story of Sherman's little-known "love affair" with the youthful sculptress Vinnie Ream, best known for creating the full-length statue of Lincoln for the Capitol Rotunda.

Michael Fellman has written a most compelling book—part psychobiography, part analysis of modern war, part military history and all of it original and gripping. Convincingly argued and elegantly written, "Citizen Sherman" supersedes the small shelf of earlier works by authors from Manning Force to Lloyd Lewis, and takes its place as the definitive modern study of the Civil War's most feared fighter (notwithstanding its odd and rather unsuitable title).

But if Fellman's achievement makes Sherman much more understandable, he remains no less frightening. They don't make his like anymore, and maybe it is for the best.



It Wasn't Quite Hell

The real campaign was relatively uneventful; this novel tries to plug the gap.

SHERMAN'S MARCH

By Cynthia Bass.
228 pp. New York:
Villard Books. \$21.

By David R. Slavitt

THE march from Atlanta to Savannah and the sea by Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman in 1864 was one of those events that transcend mere history to take on the resonance of epic. Sherman proposed the campaign as a way of bringing the Civil War to the civilian population — not out of sheer savagery but for the perfectly intelligible and even persuasive reason that the democratization of society inevitably made warfare the responsibility of the populace.

In his special order, Sherman said that "Army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless" if "guerrillas and bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads or otherwise manifest local hostility," matching Union reprisals "to the measure of such hostility." He saw such measures as necessary, and also as the most efficient means toward the restoration of peace.

The calculation of Sherman's brutality is its most striking and frightening aspect, and in her first novel, "Sherman's March," Cynthia Bass does convey with a fair degree of accuracy the tendency of the general's thought, but she gets his tone wrong, which is a great mistake. Sherman's "Memoirs" is widely available in the excellent Library of America edition, and "The Home Letters of General Sherman" is in many public libraries. Anyone who has glanced at either of these books knows that, while as a writer he did not put on airs, he still had a kind of precision and even an elegance that play to far better effect in fiction than any thuggishness or vulgarity possibly could.

To try to do so well known a voice seems nervy to me, but first novelists take long chances sometimes (which is what gives their work an extra measure of excitement). Ms. Bass bravely puts the first 60 pages in Sherman's head and in his words but gets the voice wrong. Sherman

David R. Slavitt's latest book of poems is "Crossroads." His translation of Ovid's "Metamorphoses" was just published.

was neither the hoodlum nor the prep school bully she presents, and his fury was all the more impressive for its cold clarity.

The march to the sea was relatively uneventful, but a quick glance at Shelby Foote's "Civil War: A Narrative" produces two interesting moments. One of these was the engagement — the only one, really, of the whole campaign — at the Oconee River in Georgia, where a single brigade of 15th Corps veterans slaughtered more than 600 Confederate militiamen who turned out to be mostly old men and young boys. Mr. Foote cites the reaction of a Union soldier to this extraordinary carnage: "There is no God in war. It is merciless, cruel, vindictive, un-Christian, savage, relentless. It is all that devils could wish for."

Ms. Bass doesn't even mention this fight at the Oconee. She does give us, though, a version of the crossing of Ebenezer Creek, where Sherman's engineers took up the pontoon bridge after they'd crossed, stranding liberated slaves on the other side. The slaves on the far bank stampeded into the icy water, swimmers and nonswimmers alike, and many of them drowned, despite the efforts of the Union rear guard to rescue those who could be reached.

Ms. Bass has gussied this up, perhaps to make the story more exciting, and adds something that never happened, putting a contingent of Joseph Wheeler's Confederate cavalry hot on the heels of the fleeing slaves, firing into the defenseless crowd and slashing with their sabers.

STILL, there are things Ms. Bass gets right, like this moment when a Georgia woman, burned out of her home, impoverished, takes to the road and joins the crowd of refugees: "There was much silence here. Even the wagon-to-wagon visiting was done with downcast eyes and lowered voices, the way old people talk at funerals. The questions I overheard were all negative: 'Haven't seen any firewood, have you?' 'Can't spare any salt, can you?' ... And even when the answer was yes ... the thank-yous were negative too, both parties knowing nothing had really helped, nothing had really changed; the cold were still cold, the hungry still hungry, the ill still sick and probably dying."

There are a number of such honest and truthful and therefore moving paragraphs, but they are like winning skirmishes in a losing campaign. □

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
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